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projects are subject to two opposite effects: an income effect and a set of spending 
substitution effects. The former is the traditional, unrestricted, multiplier effect; the latter is 
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them should be reassessed in the light of the countervailing substitution effects. 
 
Keywords: Government multipliers, fiscal stimulus, expenditures substitution effects. 
JEL classification: H61, C67 
 
Corresponding author: Ana-Isabel Guerra 
Ferran Sancho is also a member of the MOVE consortium at UAB. Support from project 
SEC2006-0702 is gratefully acknowledged. Errors and shortcomings are the exclusive 
responsibility of the authors. 
 2
1. Introduction 
In the wake of the current global recession little discussion has been undertaken 
for the need and the effectiveness of the so-called ‘fiscal stimulus packages’. These 
expenditure packages have been aimed at speeding up the economic recovery or, at 
the very least, slowing down its detrimental effects. Governments have come aboard 
the wagon hoping their fiscal actions will have results that are effective, quick and 
visible to the public. A variety of economic models, both macro and micro, seem to 
lend conceptual support to these initiatives although genuine doubts remain in the 
macro arena. See, for instance, Barro’s recent letter (2009) questioning the USA’s 
stimulus bill. In the micro field the support for expansionary policies comes usually 
from models that have an economy-wide perspective, like inter-industry or social 
accounting matrix based models (Miller and Blair, 1985, McGregor et al., 1996; 
Cardenete and Sancho, 2006). These micro models are demand-driven models with a, 
nonetheless, strong Keynesian flavour. They produce ‘multiplier effects’ taking 
advantage of some type of general equilibrium interactions that reflect, usually in 
quite good detail, the productive facets of an economy. Any new injections into the 
economy, regardless of their public or private origin, get ‘multiplied’ producing ripple 
effects in many sectors that in the aggregate seem to go, in fact, beyond and above 
the value of those injections.  
Several considerations are however in order. Firstly, the origin of any injection is 
relevant but, usually, it is conveniently forgotten or omitted. New private injections 
can only come from consumers (for final consumption), firms (for investment), or 
external agents (for exports). But both consumers and firms are always subjected to 
some kind of budget constraints in the domestic economy and so one must wonder 
where those injections come so easily from. Exports, on the contrary, can be a source 
 3
of unrestricted new injections. Secondly, public injections in the form of new 
expenditure from the government need to be financed. There are three options here. 
One is financing by increasing taxes, but then this will negatively affect private 
agents’ budget constraints and their spending decisions for consumption and 
investment, effectively ‘crowding out’ in some degree the expansionary effect of the 
public injection. A second option is debt financing borrowing from the savings of 
private agents, and again this may ‘crowd out’ private investment demand. Finally, 
the government may decide to finance a new policy by way of reshuffling its own 
budget constraint, i.e. more butter and fewer guns. 
There are therefore two polar cases to be considered as far as the government 
expenditure is concerned: the standard one whereby any new expenditure is somehow 
materialised without regard to its financing (‘free lunch’ scenario) and a more realistic 
one that incorporates the fact that new expenditure may actually need a reallocation 
of current patterns (‘down-to-earth’ scenario). In the first case only output effects are 
considered whereas in the second case both output and expenditure substitution 
effects are incorporated. The results can be strikingly different as we will see in the 
next Section where we use recent Spanish data to illustrate. 
2. Analysis and Results 
Let us consider an N sectors economy for which an N×N multiplier matrix M 
can be computed. This matrix can be obtained from a simple Leontief model, an 
extended SAM model or even from the Jacobian of a more sophisticated general 
equilibrium model, but we do not need the underlying details to be made explicit 
here. The only requirement is for matrix M to have constant coefficients or, more 
simply, coefficients that are not affected by government policy decisions. The usual 
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interpretation for M applies. A new policy injection of 1 unit (of euro worth) in sector 
j by the government will produce an overall increase of mij units (or euros’ worth) of 
new output in sector i. Because matrix M incorporates both direct and indirect 
effects, and possibly induced effects too, the initial unitary direct inflow ‘multiplies’ 
itself into a value greater than 1, i.e. 
1
1
N
iji
m= >∑ . The composite multiplier value is 
therefore
1
1
N
j iji
mμ == −∑ . This is the usual story if new government injections are 
fully unrestricted (‘free lunch’ scenario) and no countervailing effects are into play.  
Let us consider now a scenario where any new expenditure is constrained by the 
aggregate current level of government outlays. Therefore a new injection targeted in 
sector j needs a reduction of expenditure in the remaining sectors i j≠  so as to 
maintain the aggregate budget constraint of the government. Let δ〈 〉 be a 
redistribution scheme that guarantees the upholding of the budget constraint, i.e. 
0
N
j ii j
δ δ≠+ =∑ , for an injection of type j. There are in fact many such redistribution 
schemes but we will illustrate here considering a simple homothetic pattern that 
assumes a reduction which is proportionate to initial outlays (we refer to it as the 
‘down-to-earth’ scenario). In this case for 0jδ >  we will have appropriate values 
0iδ < for i j≠ . The initial, unrestricted, output effects mij are now conditioned by the 
countervailing spending substitution effects induced by δ〈 〉. Under the constancy 
assumption for M, if we denote by 
ij
x  the change in output i caused by an injection 
in sector j restricted by scheme δ〈 〉 we will have: 
ij j ij k ik
k j
x m mδ δ
≠
= ⋅ + ⋅∑  
Notice that xij is a measure of the opportunity costs, in terms of output, 
associated to implementation of the budget scheme δ〈 〉. Also notice that xij=mij for 
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the usual, unrestricted ‘free lunch’ scenario. The new budget constrained, composite 
multiplier value under the reshuffling rule δ〈 〉 is therefore given by:  
1 1 1
ˆ 1 1
N N N
j ij j ij k ik
i i i k j
x m mμ δ δ
= = = ≠
= − = ⋅ + ⋅ −∑ ∑ ∑∑      (1) 
Unlike the always positive unrestricted multiplier value 
j
μ , now the new 
multiplier value ˆ
j
μ  can be seen to be of any sign, positive or negative, depending on 
the relative strength of the overall positive output effects (
1
N
j iji
mδ= ⋅∑ ) versus the 
negative substitution effects (
1
N
k iki k j
mδ= ≠ ⋅∑ ∑ ). The positive output effect would 
coincide, for unitary injections, with the standard multiplier value in the unrestricted 
scenario. Additionally, expression (1) can be further transformed and decomposed into 
two distinct components: the ‘within’ sector budget constrained multiplier effect 
(
1
N
i jii
mδ= ⋅∑ ) and the ‘external’ to the recipient sector effects ( 1N i kik j i mδ≠ = ⋅∑ ∑ ). In 
other words:  
1 1
ˆ 1
N N
j i ji i ki
i k j i
m mμ δ δ
= ≠ =
= ⋅ + ⋅ −∑ ∑∑        (2) 
It can also be seen that both components, the ‘within’ sector effect and the 
derived ‘external’ output effects in the other production units contain positive and 
negative substitution effects. 
Table 1 illustrates the empirical computations of the budget constrained 
multipliers with recent 2004 data for the Spanish economy for unitary new injections, 
i.e. 1
j
δ = , with the necessary adjustments in the rest of outlays to keep the size of 
the government programs constant. The sectoral break-down corresponds to an 
aggregation of the symmetric Spanish input-output table for 2004 describing 
seventeen production units. Down the first column of the Table, we show the gross 
multiplier value when sectors sequentially receive new unitary injections subject to 
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the budget restrictions. The remaining four columns of this table describe the 
multiplier components under the two alternative decompositions presented in 
expressions (1-2). As can be asserted from these results, and in sharp contrast with 
the standard approach, multiplier values are systematically smaller than one and, 
furthermore, can be positive or negative. In fact, for the current database a majority 
of the multipliers turn out to be negative. The second column picks up the positive 
output effects—which coincide with the standard, unrestricted multiplier values. They 
are all greater than unity, as predicted from the unrestricted multiplier model. 
Substitution effects, however, counteract the positive output effects and the overall 
sign of the restricted multiplier will depend on the relative strengths of the positive 
and negative effects. Lastly, the decomposition in the last two columns provides 
information on the relative strength of internal versus external effects. This could be 
useful as a categorization of sectors in terms of the transferral of multiplier effects, 
once the restrictions are accounted for and internalized, through circuits of influence. 
3. Concluding remarks 
There is of course a whole range of possibilities between the unrestricted values 
for government multipliers and their restricted counterparts. Both cases correspond to 
polar situations but in terms of economic ‘realism’ the restricted ones should at least 
receive as much attention as the unrestricted ones. They describe a set of 
circumstances that correspond to tight budget situations that had better be put into 
the picture when assessing expenditure policies. In actual policy practice, governments 
do have some leeway to implement expenditure policies that are not fully constrained. 
The truth is probably ‘convex’ in terms of the effects of government spending and has 
to be found somewhere in-between the restricted and unrestricted multipliers. They 
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give us bounds for the effective effects of expenditure policies that are in need of a 
much more careful, detailed and systematic evaluation if we want to provide good and 
sound policy advice.  
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Table 1: Unrestricted and Budget Constrained Multipliers and Decompositions. 
Database: the Spanish Symmetric Input-Output Table for 2004. 
 
 
Positive Output and Negative 
Substitution  Effects 
 Decomposition 
Within and Out-sector Effects  
Decomposition 
PRODUCTION UNITS 
 
 
ˆ 1
j
μ+  
1
.
N
j ij
i
mδ
=
∑ * 
1
.
N
k ik
i k j
mδ
= ≠
∑∑  
1
N
i ji
i
mδ
=
⋅∑  
1
N
i ik
k j i
mδ
≠ =
∑∑  
Primary sector -0,118 1,705 -1,823 1,061 -1,180 
Extraction of Anthracite, 
Coal, Lignite and Peat -0,446 1,376 -1,822 1,002 -1,448 
Extraction of Crude, Natural 
Gas, Uranium and Thorium -0,802 1,019 -1,822 0,987 -1,789 
other extraction industries -0,078 1,743 -1,822 1,005 -1,084 
Coke, Refinery and Nuclear 
Fuels -0,104 1,718 -1,823 1,055 -1,160 
Production and Distribution 
of Electricity 0,278 2,099 -1,820 1,163 -0,885 
Production and Distribution 
of Gas -0,057 1,764 -1,823 0,997 -1,054 
Water Sector 0,036 1,858 -1,822 1,003 -0,964 
Food, beverage, tobacco, 
textile and leather products 0,395 2,190 -1,795 1,248 -0,853 
Other industries 0,276 2,097 -1,821 1,272 -0,995 
Chemistry Industry, rubber 
and plastic industry -0,045 1,777 -1,823 1,206 -1,252 
Manufacturing industry 0,067 1,882 -1,814 1,267 -1,200 
Construction sector 0,622 2,346 -1,724 1,440 -0,817 
Commercial and Transport 
Activities -0,029 1,796 -1,825 1,117 -1,147 
Market services -0,198 1,676 -1,875 1,077 -1,275 
Market R&D -0,052 1,770 -1,822 1,004 -1,056 
Public Sectors -0,403 1,515 -1,919 1,039 -1,442 
*The positive output effects coincide with the standard multiplier value under the unrestricted 
scenario: 1
j
μ + . 
 
 
 
 
